Uniform TitleDynamic spectrum access models: towards an engineering perspective in the spectrum debate
NameIleri, Omer (author), Mandayam, Narayan (chair), Yates, Roy (internal member), Raychaudhuri, Dipankar (internal member), Comaniciu, Cristina (outside member), Rutgers University, Graduate School - New Brunswick,
SubjectElectrical and Computer Engineering,
Wireless communication systems,
Radio frequency allocation,
DescriptionThe increased demand for wireless communications services, and innovations in smart radio technologies have spurred a debate in the recent past regarding the efficiency of the spectrum governance policy of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The two main camps that have emerged in this yet non-conclusive debate are the ones that are proponents of (i) the spectrum property rights and (ii) the spectrum commons. In this dissertation, we first present a detailed overview of the ongoing spectrum debate and then present two engineering models that allow certain types of realistic comparisons to be made.
We call these models dynamic property-rights spectrum access (D-Pass) and dynamic-commons property-rights spectrum access (D-CPass). While both models introduced retain a bias toward the spectrum property rights approach based usage of spectrum, they also promote dynamic access and short term dedication of spectrum resources. Specifically, we consider a framework where operators compete for spectrum and users in a geographical area. A spectrum policy server (SPS) functions as a controller/enforcer as well as a clearinghouse for spectrum allocations.
In the D-Pass model, the operators pay the SPS for the exact amount of bandwidth they are allocated, irrespective of the utilization of the bandwidth. Each operator competes for users via rate and price offers for utilizing the spectrum portion under its short term "ownership." We model the operator competition in the form of a
SPS-mediated iterative bidding scheme that is reminiscent of a simultaneous ascending auction. In the D-CPass model, all operators
have access to all the available bandwidth during the competition phase. The operators pay the SPS for the portion of the spectrum that they actually utilize (pay-as-you-go). They compete for each user via rate and price offers through an SPS-mediated iterative bidding scheme that is reminiscent of a single-item ascending auction. Our results indicate that both the spectrum access mechanism and the market forces play an important role in determining the resulting bandwidth utilization. Furthermore, under negligible spectrum usage costs, the commons-like model (D-CPass) promotes greater utilization of spectrum resources.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references (p. 109-111).
CollectionGraduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.