RUcore Resource Object
RUcore Resource Object
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Uniform TitleImagination and epistemology
NameIchikawa, Jonathan (author), Sosa, Ernest (chair), Goldman, Alvin (internal member), Stanley, Jason (internal member), Weatherson, Brian (internal member), Szabo Gendler, Tamar (outside member), Rutgers University, Graduate School - New Brunswick,
Degree Date2008-10
Date Created2008
SubjectPhilosophy,
Imagination (Philosophy),
Knowledge, Theory of
DescriptionAmong the tools the epistemologist brings to the table ought to be, I suggest, a firm understanding of the imagination--one that is informed by philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. In my dissertation, I highlight several ways in which such an understanding of the imagination can yield insight into traditional questions in epistemology. My dissertation falls into three parts.
In Part I, I argue that dreaming should be understood in imaginative terms, and that this has important implications for questions about dream skepticism. In Part II, I argue that an understanding of the imagination is important for understanding important parts of philosophical methodology--particularly those involving thought experiments. I mean in Part II to be vindicating a great deal of traditional methodology. In Part III, I explore what I take to be a number of deep connections between knowledge and counterfactuals. I defend a form of contextualism in each domain, and argue that inference among imaginings, with its important structural similarities to inference in belief, plays a central role in the epistemology of counterfactuals.
In Part I, I argue that dreaming should be understood in imaginative terms, and that this has important implications for questions about dream skepticism. In Part II, I argue that an understanding of the imagination is important for understanding important parts of philosophical methodology--particularly those involving thought experiments. I mean in Part II to be vindicating a great deal of traditional methodology. In Part III, I explore what I take to be a number of deep connections between knowledge and counterfactuals. I defend a form of contextualism in each domain, and argue that inference among imaginings, with its important structural similarities to inference in belief, plays a central role in the epistemology of counterfactuals.
NotePh.D.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references (p. 169-173).
Genretheses
Persistent URLhttp://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.2/rucore10001600001.ETD.17494
LanguageEnglish
CollectionGraduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.