TitleAffirmative action is not morally justified
NameMurtaugh, Bernard Joseph (author), Husak, Douglas (chair), Rutgers University, Graduate School - New Brunswick,
Affirmative action programs
DescriptionThis dissertation is a critical examination and rejection
of the two principal types of moral justification, the
compensatory and noncompensatory, of affirmative action involving preferential treatment (AA) for blacks, Hispanics,American Indians, and women in hiring, promotions, andadmissions. Neither of these approaches to the justification of AA, I have argued, is able to defend AA successfully. AA not morally justified.
Thus, succeeding compensatory arguments for AA, individualand group oriented, are unable to evade, undermine,or disarm the objections that AA violates the principles of compensatory justice governing who is owed compensation, what compensation is owed, and who owes compensation, and that AA violates the principles of justice and fundamental individual moral rights governing the distribution of such social goods or benefits as desirable and valuable positions. The principles of justice and moral rights violated by AA govern the distribution of social benefits, including
desirable positions, and burdens and systematize, unify, and explain correct moral judgments about the injustice of actions, policies, and practices in a variety of contexts of distribution. Moreover, backward-looking or compensatory arguments for AA have the implication that unjust and morally unacceptable compensatory policies that are morally similar to AA would be justified in contexts other than hiring, promotions, and admissions. Furthermore, the noncompensatory
justifications of AA, including meritocratic and utilitarian forward-looking arguments, are unable to evade or to undermine the objection that AA violates principles of
justice and fundamental individual moral rights and the
objection that these attempted justifications of AA have the implication that unjust and morally unacceptable noncompensatory, forward-looking policies that are morally similar to AA would also be justified in contexts other than the standard ones.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references (p. 769-771)
Noteby Bernard Joseph Murtaugh
CollectionGraduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.