TitleE pluribus unum?
NameFilindra, Alexandra (author), Tichenor, Daniel (chair), Junn, Jane (co-chair), Kelemen, Dan (internal member), Fine, Janice (internal member), Smith, Rogers (outside member), Rutgers University, Graduate School - New Brunswick,
Emigration and immigration--Political aspects,
United States--Emigration and immigration--History
DescriptionUnlike the assumptions contained in the federal plenary power doctrine, immigration policy in the United States is the result of conflict, collaboration and intense interaction between the states and the federal governments. Since the 19th century, immigration policy making has exhibited familiar patterns: when state and federal objectives have been aligned, states act as backers of federal policy, often using their legislative authority to strengthen federal immigration law. When preferences diverge, states become powerful lobbyists who can use their legislative authority to keep immigration-related issues on the top of the federal agenda. Large, electorally rich states are particularly effective pressure agents. Electoral and political concerns often lead the federal government to yield to state pressure and implement immigration reforms (often restrictive) that are consistent with state preferences.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references (p. 259-299)
Noteby Alexandra Filindra
CollectionGraduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work