TitleThe Basel Capital Adequacy Accords and the governance of global finance
NameHerman, Daniel Louis (author), Ferguson, Yale H. (chair), Langhorne, Richard (internal member), Cantwell, John (internal member), Spatareanu, Mariana (internal member), Rutgers University, Graduate School - Newark,
Basel II (2004)
DescriptionWhat is the net contribution of the Basel Accords to the governance of global finance? The methodology used in this dissertation for assessing the costs and benefits of the Basel Process is the comparison of intended consequences and unintended consequences. Intended consequences are in the public interest and regarded as benefits. The unintended consequences are the side effects of those regulations which, it is assumed, no regulator would have deliberately selected or favored. They are the costs of the Basel Process. The major unintended consequence discussed in this dissertation is the accumulation of over-leveraged and undercapitalized financial risks outside the banking supervisory framework of the Basel Accords. The conclusion of this dissertation is that while the Accords have contributed to the stability of the international banking system, they have also given market participants the incentive to evade regulations and create financial risks in the “shadow banking system.” The Basel Accords, in short, indirectly contributed to the Panic of 2008 and the Global Financial Crisis. Therefore, the costs of the Basel Process have outweighed its benefits.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
Noteby Daniel Louis Herman
CollectionGraduate School - Newark Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.